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Petitioner, Daniel Scott Cox, Pro Se, appologizes to 
the Court for any unintended offense as regards to the filing of 
materials. His sole objective was and is to perfect and protect 
his rights but he will refrain from any future filings which 
appear to be questionable. Petitioner certifies that this 
petition is presented in good faith and not for delay based upon 
the issues at Indentures 2 — 7 here—in. 
Petitioner files this Petition for Rehearing per Rule 
35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure because the 
Memorandum Decision overlooks or misapprehends: 
(1) Petitioner's Motions for Protective orders and his 
Motions for Sanctions 
(2) the Court of Appeal?s mandatory obligations to comply 
with UCA 78-2a-3<4>, 
(3) that per UCA 35-1-82.53, an "Order on Review" by the 
Commission is a FINAL ORDER, that per R568-1-4(0) such 
<1> 
"Order on Review" is to be "governed by the provisions of 
Section 63—46b—14", that such "Order on Review" must be 
considered to have been issued on 17 November 1997, that 
Petitioner's Petition is taken against this "Order on 
Review", and that the Court of Appeals therefore has subject 
matter jurisdiction as the Petition is from a final "Order", 
(4) that the exceptions of UCA 63-46b-14(2)(a) & (b) DO 
apply and that Petitioner is not required to exhaust his 
administrtive remedies, and 
(5) that the 14 July 1997 date is not the date of the 
commission's "Order on Review" (17 November 1997), and 
therefore cannot be used to determine whether or not 
Petitioner met the 30 day time limit of UCA 63-46b-14(3)(a). 
The Memorandum Decision therefore violates Petitioner's 
Constitutional rights under Article I, Sections 1, 7, 11 atnd 24 
of the Utah Constitution, and Amendment XIV, Section 1 of the 
U-S- Constitution as presented here-in, justifying a Rehearing. 
FACTS RELEVANT TO THE COURT'S MEMORANDUM DECISION 
1.0 Petitioner has met all of the timelines required for 
Appeal to the Commission and to the Court of Appeals-
1.1 On 7/14/97, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) without 
explaination or finding of fact: 
* Dismissed Respondents 7 March 1997 Motion to Dismiss 
which they had failed to sustain and which was fully 
disputed by Petitioner and Dr. Avery's letter of 10 Mar 97. 
* Denied Petitioner's 8 May 1997 Uncontested Motions for 
Sanctions against Respondents for falsifications, omissions, 
misrepresentations, and like misconduct presented to the 
Commission in their 7 March 1997 Motion to Dismiss. 
* Denied Petitioner's 8 May and 24 June 1997 Uncontested 
Motions for Sanctions for Respondents refusal to release 
Interrogatories to Petitioner as "Ordered" by the ALJ-
* Dismissed Petitioner's Uncontested Motion for Summary 
Judgement which was supported by 50+ unchallenged records. 
1.2 On 30/31 July 1997, 17 days after the ALJ?s "Order", 
Petitioner filed his Appeal (Motion for Review) with the 
(2) 
Commission and ALJ under UCA 63-46(b)-12 as allowed by R568-1-
4 CM) and UCA 35-1-82.53(1) on grounds that the dismissal and 
denials of his Uncontested Motions were "Arbitrary and 
Capricious", "Contrary to Whole Record", and an "Abuse of 
Discretion", issues of law under UCA 63—46(b)—16, complying with 
the 30 day time limit specified under UCA 63-46(b)-12(1)(a). 
1-3 The Commission, instead of issuing their "Written Order 
on Review" as mandated by UCA 63-46b-12(6)(a), notified 
Petitioner of a new Hearing date. 
* Notice of 15 September 1997 setting Hearing for 9 
December 1997 
* Notice of 27 October 1997 setting Hearing for 2 March 
1998 
1.4 Petitioner requested status of his Appeal, and stay of 
the scheduled Hearing because of Respondents failure to obey 
Commission "Orders" r e g a r d i n g d iscovery and t h e Commission's 
failure to act upon Petitioner's Appeal (Motion for Review). 
* 19 Sept 1997, Letter requesting status of Appeal 
* 23 Sept 1997, Motion for Stay of Hearing 
* 19 Oct 1997, Letter requesting status of Appeal 
* 28 Oct 1997, Letter concerning Appeal 
* 08 Nov 1997, Letter to Commission giving notice that as 
of 17 November 1997, absent any action by the Commission, 
that Petitioner would have exhausted his administrative 
remedies, and was entitled to proceed "to file for Review by 
the Appellate Court" (Attachment A) 
* 12 Nov 1997, Letter to ALJ requesting relief on Hearing 
1-5 On 8 December 1997 Petitioner filed his Petition for 
Review, Reversal and Award where the Commission's "Order on 
Review" was presumed to sustain the ALJ's "Order" and was 
"considered to have been entered" on 17 November 1997. 
1.6 UCA 35-1-82.53(2) clearly states that "Orders on 
Review" are final agency orders. 
(3) 
"The order of the commission on review is final, unless set 
aside by the Court of Appeals." (Emphasis added) 
1-7 Worker's Compensation Rule R56B-1-4(0) states: 
"Any petition for judicial review of the Commission's Order 
on Motion for Review shall be governed by the provisions of 
Section 63-46b-14? U.C.A." 
1.8 That Petitioner's Petition for Review, Reversal and 
Award was filed 21 calender and 20 legal days after the 
Commission's "Order on Review" of 17 November 1997? therefore 
complying with the 30 day requirement of UCA 63—46b—14(3)(a). 
PETITION FOR REVIEW -BASIS 
2. The Memorandum Decision Overlooks Petitioner's 
Uncontested Motions for Sanctions 
3. The Memorandum Decision Overlooks Petitioner's 
Uncontested Motion for Protective Order Regarding Respondents 
Refusal to Release UOSH Allowed "Exposure and Medical Records" 
Properly Reguested under UOSH Statutes and Regulations 
4. The Memorandum Decision Overlooks Mandatory Duties 
Under UCA 7S-2a-3(4)„ and Misapprehends Petitioner's Right For 
Review, Reversal and Award Of The Commission's "Order on Review", 
Where Such Order Is A Final Order Over Which The Court of Appeals 
Has Subject Matter Jurisdiction. 
Petitioner respectfuly cites UCA 78—2a—3<4>: 
"The Court of Appeals SHALL comply with the requirements of 
Title 63, Chapter 46b? Administrative Proceedures Act, in 
its review of agency adjudicative proceedings." ("SHALL" 
being interpreted as "Mandatory" per *Varian—Eimac, 767 P2d 
570' — Emphasis added) 
Tfius t h e C o u r t o f A p p e a l s must t h e r e f o r e comply w i t h 
UCA 63-46b-12(l) which states in relevant part: 
"If a statute or the agency's rules permit parties to any 
adjudicative proceeding to seek review of an order by the 
agency ... the aggrieved party may file a written request 
for review within 30 days after the issuance of the order 
..." (Emphasis added) 
Where the Labor Commission Rules and Worker's 
Compensation Statutes permit Petitioner to file under UCA 63-46b-
(4) 
12 as stated. 
"Any party in interest who is dissatisfied with the order 
entered by an administrative law judge may seek review of 
that order with the commision by complying with the 
commission's rules governing that review." UCA 35—1 — 
82-53(1) 
"Any party to an adjudicative proceeding seeking review of 
an Order by the Agency may file a written request for review 
in succor d^nne with the provisions of Sections 63-46b-12 ... 
A Motion for Review of ANY order entered by an 
Administrative Law Judge may be filed pursuant to the 
provisions of Section 63-46b-12, UCA." R568-1-4(M) 
(Emphasis added) 
Thus Petitioner properly appealed for administrative 
review under UCA 63-46b-12 the ALJ's "Order" of 14 July 1997 
dismissing or denying Petitioner's Uncontested Motions- The 
Commission there-afterward had a mandatory obligation to issue a 
"Written Order on Review" which by statute is a "FINAL ORDERS": 
"Within a reasonable time ... the agency ... SHALL issue a 
written order on review-" UCA 63-46b-12(6)(a) 
"The order of the commission on review is final, unless set 
aside by the Court of Appeals." UCA 35-1-82-53(2) (Emphasis 
added) 
Worker's Compensation Rules and statutes unequivocably 
dictate the manner in which such "Orders on Review" Are to be 
governed when submitted for judicial review: 
"Any petition for judicial review of the Commission's Order 
on Motion for Review shall be governed by the provisions of 
Section 63-46b-14, U-C-A-" R568-l-4(0) 
"A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final 
agency action ..." UCA 63-46b-14(l) 
Which is proper because the commission's "Order on 
Review" is a final agency action over which the Court of Appeals 
has subject matter jurisdiction through UCA 78-2a-3(4). 
Petitioner respectfuly points out that there is a 
(5) 
significant and substantive difference between UCA 73-2a-3(2)(a) 
as relied upon by the Court and UCA 78-2a-3(4) as demonstrated 
above. Reliance on UCA 78-2a-3(2)(a) restricts Appellate 
jurisdiction to final orders resulting from formal ad judicative 
proceedings while compliance with UCA 78-2a-3(4) mandates subject 
matter jurisdiction over ANY "Order" of an ALJ brought forward 
for judicial review under and through UCA 63-46B-12. And the 
language of UCA 63—46b—14(i) does not restrict subject matter 
jurisdiction to orders from formal adjudicative proceedings. As 
demonstrated above, subject matter jurisdiction may arise from 
ANY "Order" of an ALJ, thus any time in the adjudicative process. 
The legislative intent of the Worker's Compensation Act 
was to confer subject matter jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals 
over ANY "Order" not just "Final Orders resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings". 
"The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review, reverse, 
or annul ANY order of the commission ..." UCA 53-1-86 
(Emphasis added) 
"Agency means ... commission ... officer ... including ... 
agency employees, or other persons acting on behalf of or 
under the authority of the agency head ..." UCA 63—46b— 
2(1)(b) 
Thus the Worker's Compensation Statutes and Rules 
clearly invoke subject matter jurisdiction over ANY "Order" of an 
ALJ to the Court of Appeals through UCA 63—46b—12 by virtue of 
i 
the mandatory compliance required by UCA 78—2a—3(4). And the 
misapprehension or inadvertent overlooking of this jurisdiction 
is 
contrary to the Legislative Intent of the Statutes, and violates 
Petitioner's rights to due process under Article I, Sections 1 & 
11 of the Utah Constitution as well as Amendment XIV, Section 1 
(6) 
of the U.S. Constitution. 
5- The Court's Decision Memorandum Overlooks Or Misapprehends 
Petitioner's Riqht To Review Of His Petition Without Exhaustion 
Of All Administrative Remedies 
UCA 63—46b—14(2) cites exceptions under which 
exhaustion of remedies is not required. 
"A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all 
administrative remedies available, except that: <a> a party 
seeking judicial review need not exhaust administrative 
remedies if this chapter OR any other statute states that 
exhaustion is not required." (Emphasis added) 
The Memorandum Decision misapprehends these exceptions 
stating "Utah Code Ann $ 63-46b-14 (1997) governs '• judicial 
review of final agency action.7 With limited exceptions not 
applicable in this case." 
The two exceptions under UCA 63-46b-14(2)(a) are 
presented in the disjunctive form, therefore if either exception 
is found to exist, the requirement to exhaust administrative 
remedies is waived and is not applicable. Both exceptions Bre 
applicable, thus exhaustion of administrative remedies is not 
required. 
5.1 SECOND EXCEPTION - ANY OTHER STATUTE 
Petitioner again cites UCA 35—1—86 which places no 
limitations on the Court's jurisdiction regarding the exhaustion 
of remedies. 
"The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review, reverse or 
annul ANY order of the commission.." 3kf_ 
Thus, this statute declares that since ANY order may be 
reviewed, it is not necessary to proceed to a Hearing as 
misapprehended by the Memorandum Decision which states: 
"Because no hearing has occurred in the agency, no agency 
(7) 
decision constituting final agency action has issued." 
But this statement overlooks the fact that the 
Commision's "Order on Review" which must be considered to have 
been isued on 17 November 1997 is in fact a final agency action. 
Petitioner points out the Constitutional implications 
of this oversight as evident from his own circumstance where the 
Worker's Compenstion Rules state: 
"Any party ... may file a written request for review ... 
Unless so files the Order will become the award of the 
Commission and will be final." R568-1-4CM) 
Thus had Petitioner failed to file for review of the 
ALJ's denial of his Motions for Sanctions where no findings of 
fact were made, the ALJ's Order would have become the final award 
of the Commission - which 3LW3ird would have not been Reviewable 
before this Court because Petitioner would have failed to exhaust 
his administrative remedies of appeal as allowed by this rule. 
And now, if this Court denies Review, then Petitioner will have 
been denied the very due process he sought to protect by 
conforming to the Worker's compensation rules and statutes. This 
condition would result in the Unconstitutional denial of due 
process under Article I? Section 11 of the Utah Constitution and 
Amendment XIV, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution. 
The consequence had Petitioner not filed for review 
before the Commission, or if this Court denies his right to 
Review, will be that the ALJ's denial will stand and the 
falsifications, misrepresentations, omissions, refusals to 
cooperate with discovery, fraudulent medical diagnosis etc as 
clearly demonstrated to exist in Petitioner's Motions for 
<8) 
Sanctions will remain before the Commission and ALJ as though 
they were truthful representations. And where the Commission and 
ALJ have sole jurisdiction over findings of fact, and any error 
must remain there. Petitioner's Constitutional rights to due 
process are violated because of the failure to assure an unbiased 
Hearing where any fact found in favor of Respondents based upon 
these improprieties would not be subject to appeal. 
Further, the purpose of Petitioner's Motion for Summary 
Judgement was to terminate Respondents maintenance of an 
unmeritorious denial of compensbi1ity where they assert a 
pre-existing condition disputed by 6 doctors and 1 Psychologist 
yet present no defense as demonstrated by the facts at Indentures 
1.1 here—in, and Petitioner had already accrued substantial and 
unnecessary expenses associated with Respondents unmeritorious 
denial of compensability which have subsequently escalated now 
including $3,727 in out of pocket expenses and $2,628 dollars in 
unpaid legal fees (Ref Brief on Constitutional Reasonableness of 
Sanctions, Damages & Costs dated 2 June 1997). 
Statute UCA 35—1—86 provides for such a circumstance, 
allowing review without exhaustion of administrative remedies, 
thus protecting Petitioner's: (1) right to "have remedy ... 
without ... unnecessary delay" as guaranteed by Section 11 of the 
Utah Constitution, (b) right to a "... just, speedy and 
inexpensive determination of Chis3 action" as intended by Rule 1 
of the Utah Civil Rules of Procedure, and (3) right to obtain 
compensation in a "simple, said speedy" manner, "eliminating the 
expense, delay and uncertainty in having to prove negligence on 
(9) 
the part of employer" (See Wi1 stead, 407 P2d 692; Park Utah 
Cnsol- Mines, 36 P2d 979; Barber, 135 P2d 266). 
5.2 FIRST EXCEPTION - PROVISIONS QF CHAPTER 63-46B 
Petitioner respectfuly cites UCA 63—46b—1(4) from this 
chapter which states in relevant part: 
"This chapter does not preclude an agency, prior to the 
beginning of an adjudicative proceeding ... from ... (b) 
granting a timely motion ... for summary judgement if the 
requirements of ... Rule 56 ... of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure are met by the moving party - - -" (Enphasis added) 
Thus, the effect of this provision on UCA 63—46b— 
14(2)(a) is to assure that summary judgements are facilitated by 
review without exhaustion of administrative remedies — similarly 
to the effect of UCA 35—1—86 as discussed above- And as 
demonstrated by the facts at Indenture 1.1 here—in, Sumary 
Judgement was fully warrented because there was no dispute as to 
the facts and arguments of Petitioner's Motion for Summary 
Judgement, nor was there any dispute or denial by Respondents 
that they had based their 7 March 1997 Motion for Dismissal on 
falsifications, misrepresentations, omissions, violations of 
"Orders" to produce Interrogatories and like misconduct. 
5-3 Effect Of Exceptions Under UCA 63-46b-14(2)(a) 
Where the Memorandum Decision overlooks or 
misapprehends the applicability of the exceptions of UCA 63—46b— 
14(2)(a) to Petitioner's Petition for Review, Petitioner would be 
denied his right to review without exhaustion of his 
administrative remedies as conferred by UCA 35-1-86 and UCA 63-
46b—1(4) and would therefore be denied his right to due process 
under Article I, Sections 1, 7 & 11 of the Utah Constitution as 
<10) 
well as Amendment XIV, Section i of the U.S. Constitution. 
Petitioner also observes that had the ALJ awarded 
Summary Judgment to Petitioner that Respondents would have had 
right to judicial review under UCA 63-46b-14 without exhaustion 
of administratives, and that the denial of Petitioner's right 
of equivalent judicial review concerning the disposition of his 
Uncontested Motion for Summary Judgement without exhaustion of 
administrative remedies would violate the equal protection 
clauses of Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution and 
Amendment XIV, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution. 
5.4 Effect of UCA 65-46b-14(2)(b)(ii) 
Here—in, the Court of Appeals is granted discretion to 
relieve a party of exhaustion of administrative remedies if the 
exhaustion would "result in irreparable harm disproportionate to 
the public benefit derived from requiring exhaustion." Id 
Petitioner simply argues that even if the Court held 
that exhaustion was required under UCA 63-46b-14(2)(a), that the 
circumstances of Petitioner's case would warrent granting of this 
discretionary relief. Where there are approximately 80,000 
industrial injuries each year in Utah, it is unthinkable to 
condone the egregious practices used by Respondents: (a) to 
improperly deny compensability where six (6) doctors and One (1) 
Psychologist assert that Petitioner does not have a pre-existing 
condition, and/or that his injury was work related, (b) to 
improperly seek dismissal, and (c) to force Petitioner to 
shoulder the burden of a 2 year adjudicative process to obtain 
compensation when Respondents justification for their denial of 
(11) 
compensability is fully disputed, offer no denial as regards to 
their misconduct characterized in Petitioner's Uncontested 
Motions for Sanctions, and fail to contest, dispute or otherwise 
controvert Petitioner's Uncontested Motion for Summary Judgement 
(See Indenture 1.1 here—in). Any such precedent would allow 
employers or insurers the opportunity to totally subvert the 
Legislative intent and Constitutionality of the Worker's 
Compensation Act for the sake of their personal financial gain 
while depriving thousands of their rights to due process. 
The Court of Appeals must therefore grant this 
discretion to Petitioner so that his Petition may be heard for 
the benefit of all injured workers, as reflected by the prior 
opinions in 'Norris' and 'Arnica'. 
"We do not mean to say that when doctors give what appear to 
be convincing opinions that they will be considered as 
contradicted by the introduction of some opposite, 
unreasoable unsubstantiated make—believe opinion." Norris, 
61 P2d 416 
"... when the moving party has presented evidence sufficient 
to support a judgement in its favor, and the opposing party 
fails to submit contrary evidence, a trial court is 
justified in concluding that no genuine issue of fact is 
present or would be present at trial." Arnica, 768 P2d 957 
To protect the broader public interest, the exhaustion 
of administrative remedies must not be required, and Petitioner's 
Petition for Review must be granted. 
6- The Memorandum Decision's Reliance Qn 14 July 1997 As The 
Date From Which Petitioner's Petition For Judicial Review Should 
Be Based Misapprehends The Facts 
"Petitioner filed a request for judicial review of the July 
14, 1997 order of an administrative law judge denying 
Petitioner's motion for summary judgement ..." (Pg2, Para 1 
of Memorandum Decision) 
This statement is not accurate. Petitioner properly 
(12) 
and timely filed his appeal (Motion for Review) with the 
Commission on 31 July 1997 under UCA 63-46b-12 in order to obtain 
their decision via an "Order on Review" which the Commission had 
a
 mandatory obligation to issue per UCA 63—46b-12(6>(a) (Shall 
being mandatory per 'Varian-Eimac Id')-
The Commission's failure to issue their "Order on 
Review" in a timely manner as mandated by statute, and their 
action to force Petitioner to a Hearing without Interrogatories 
previously "Ordered" to be provided by Respondents by the 
Commission, violated Petitioner's rights to due process. 
To protect his rights to due process, Petitioner gave 
notice on 8 November 1997 that he would consider his 
administrative remedies exhausted as of 17 November 1997, and 
"may therefore proceed to file for Review by the Appellate 
Court."- This notice was based upon Petitioner's review of UCA 
63-46b-13 & UCA 63-46b-14(3)(a) where it was appropriate to file 
within 30 days of the date that the "Order constituting final 
agency action is issued or is considered to have been issued." 
Thus on 17 November 1997, when no "Order on Review" 
was issued. Petitioner understood the Commission to affirm the 
"Order" of the ALJ and on that day "CONSIDERED" the Commission's 
"Order on Review" to have issued. Thus, Petitioner's 8 December 
1997 petition for judicial review regarding the substance of the 
ALJ's 14 July 1997 "Order" as affirmed by the Commission's "Order 
on Review" was properly and timely presented to the Court of 
Appeals. This filing was 21 calendar and 20 legal days after 17 
November 1997, thus complying with UCA 63-46b-14(3>(a). 
(13) 
"Any petition for judicial review of the Commissions Order 
on Motion for Review shall be governed by Section 63—46b—14, 
U.C.A." R568-l-4<0> 
The Memorandum Decision presumes that the 14 July 1997 
date governs, but statutes do not allow the direct appeal of an 
ALJ?s order, and Petitioner complied with the statutes to obtain 
the Commission's "Order on Review". 
THE FACT THAT THE COMMISSION FAILED OR REFUSED TO PROPERLY 
AND TIMELY PERFORM THEIR MANDATORY STATUTORY OBLIGATION TO 
ISSUE THEIR "ORDER ON REVIEW" CANNOT BAR PETITIONER FROM 
PROTECTING HIS RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS. 
The 30 day timeline for filing of Petitioner's petition 
for judicial review must run from 17 November 1997- Therefore 
the Court of Appeals has subject matter jurisdiction. The 
Misaprehension of the Memorandum Decision violates Petitioner's 
rights to due proces under the Utah and U.S. Constitutions. 
7. The Citation In Regards To *Varian-Eimac* In The Decision 
Memorandum Is Improper 
This 'Varian-Eimac" precedent relates to the Courts 
subject matter jurisdiction where the time limit for filing has 
been overstepped. The 15 day time limit applicable in 'Varian-
Eimac' has been repealed and no longer applies. The 30 day limit 
of UCA 63-46b-14 controls. Petitioner has fully met the 30 day 
time limit (See Indentures 1 & subs here-in and 6 above), 
therefore the citation of 'Starian-Eimac? is improper as the 
Court of Apeals has subject matter jurisdiction because the 
filing times at both the Commision level and Appellate Court 
level are fully complied with. Imposition of the 15 day time 
limit would violate existing statutes and would violate 
Petitioner's Constitutional rights to due process. 
(14) 
8. Summar i z at i on 
The Memorandum Decision overlooks or misapprehends: (a) 
statutes and rules which assure Petitioner's rights to due 
process and which the Court of Appeals must comply with thru UCA 
78—2a—3(4), (b) the applicability of the exceptions under UCA 63— 
46b—14(2) which demonstrate that Petitioner is not required to 
exhaust his administrative remedies in order to obtain access to 
the Court of Appeals without denial in order to establish his 
right to compensation by Summary Judgement without unnecessary 
delay, and (c) the facts and clearly stated statutory language of 
UCA 35-1-82-53, UCA 63-46b-12, UCA 63-46b-14(3)(a) and Rule Rule 
R568-1-4(M) which demonstrate that Petitioner's timelimit for 
filing his Petition for Review, Reversal and Award with the Court 
of Appeals runs from 17 November 1997 not 14 July 1997 and that 
Petitioner has met the statutory time limits for filing with the 
Commission and with the Court of Appeals. 
Therefore, Petitioner respectfully prays for a 
Rehearing in order to assure that his rights under Article I, 
Sections 1, 7 & 11 of the Utah Constitution and under Amendment 
XIV, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution Bre not violated. 
Respectfully submitted this lY day of June 1997 
Daniel Scott Cox 
Pro Se 
(15) 
